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I. INTRODUCTION
The electoral results of last European elections in 20041, have 
produced a preoccupation and have raised a debate, not only 
in the political sphere but also in the academic realm, around a 
topic that has been enormously influential in the development 
of political science; the disengaged attitudes that citizens have 
been increasingly showing towards the political process. Grou-
ping the 25 countries of the European Union in one category, 
less than half (45 percent) of the Europeans having the right 
to vote took part in the election. Electoral turnout ranged from 
about 90 percent in Belgium and Luxembourg (where voting is 
legally mandatory), to about 20 percent in Slovakia and Poland. 
These low turnout levels have revealed a trend of what has 
been labelled as political disaffection. Additionally, they show 
the same pattern which has been discovered several times in 
the past (e.g. Klingemann, 1999): when it comes to political 
disaffection, Europe is divided in three parts. In Western and 
Northern Europe, citizens are rather engaged, but not to the 
same extent as 20 years ago. In Southern Europe, citizens are 
traditionally rather dissafected, and in the new democracies in 
Eastern Europe only a minority is engaged in political life.
* This article is based on a previous version of the paper delivered during the 55th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), held 
in New York on May 2005. In this new document, we employed the same analytical dynamics, but using an updated database. The conclusions are quite similar. 
** Universidad de Granada. ogluengo@ugr.es
*** Universität Mainz. mmaurer@uni-mainz.de
1 The final revision of this article was written one month before the European elections of 2009, expecting similar levels of electoral turnout. We would like to 
express our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers. Their comments and suggestions contributed definitely to improve the final document. 
A Virtuous Circle for All? Media Exposure and Political Trust in Europe*
Oscar G. Luengo** y Marcus Maurer***
The low levels of electoral turnout during the last European elections have raised a debate around the increasing disengagement that citizens have 
been showing towards the political process in general. Explanations from political communication suggest some contrasting arguments around this 
issue that has been configured as a constant in the academic debate: the relationship between the mass media and the political commitment. On 
one hand, we find authors that accuse the media and especially the negative presentation of politics of causing citizens’ disaffection. On the other 
hand, some recent analyses state that political information in the media —regardless of their tone— leads to an informed and engaged public. Taking 
the cited framework as the main reference, this article compares the connection between trust in parliamentary national institutions, as one of the 
dimensions of political disaffection, and the media in 21 European countries categorized in three groups: the Western and Northern countries, known 
as stable democracies with high levels of trust, the Southern countries, known as rather disaffected and the young democracies in Eastern Europe.
Keywords: media, political trust, European elections, political disaffection
¿Un círculo virtuoso para todos? Exposición mediática y confianza política en Europa
Los bajos niveles de votantes, durante las últimas elecciones europeas, han hecho surgir el debate acerca del creciente alejamiento político que los 
ciudadanos han demostrado hacia el proceso político en general. La comunicación política ofrece explicaciones que sugieren algunos argumentos 
contrastantes acerca de la cuestión que ha sido configurada como una constante en el debate académico: la relación entre los medios masivos y 
el compromiso político. Por una parte, se encontraron autores que acusan a los medios y especialmente a su presentación negativa de la política 
que provoca la desafección de los ciudadanos. Por otra parte, algunos análisis recientes aseguran que la información política en los medios —sin 
importar su tono— logra un público informado y comprometido. Tomando el marco citado como referencia principal, este artículo compara la rel-
ación entre confianza en las instituciones nacionales parlamentarias, una de las dimensiones de la desafección política, y los medios de 21 países 
europeos categorizados en tres grupos: los países occidentales y del norte, conocidos como democracias estables con altos niveles de confianza, 
los países del sur, conocidos como los desafectos y los jóvenes democracias de Europa del este. 
Palabras clave: medios, confianza política, elecciones europeas, desafecto político
Fecha de recepción: 09/01/09         Fecha de aceptación: 20/04/09










A Virtuous Circle for All?
Many political scientists have called attention to this specific 
situation, which has considered quite concern among experts 
given the widespread feelings of low identification with the 
political process. Professionals, as well as scholars, have focu-
sed their efforts in understanding the complex developments 
through which we have derived in this particular guideline of 
conduct with respect to the public; the specific nature of these 
situations has to do with the low rates of political participa-
tion in general, with the negative evaluation of governmental 
performance, with a low degree of political knowledge and in-
terest, and with an extended lack of identification with public 
institutions.  
The concept of political disaffection is having a lot of sig-
nificance today since it specifically characterizes the general 
trend of contemporary western world’s political culture. This 
process is described basically by the combination, on the one 
hand, of low levels of electoral turnout, political participation, 
political efficacy, political knowledge, political understanding, 
and, on the other hand, a firm approval of democratic princi-
ples, and has been pointed out as a potential component of 
political system’s instability. Social sciences in general, and 
political and media sciences specifically, have explored the 
causes of these behavioural patterns and have developed a 
theoretical framework to face this challenging phenomenon. 
The belief that the processes of political communication have 
substantially contributed to the attenuation of the citizen’s 
political and civic engagement has become a constant convic-
tion between scholars and journalists, especially in the North 
American context. Nevertheless, the development of political 
communication as a discipline suggests some contrasting ex-
planations around the relationship between the mass media 
and the political engagement. Moreover, we find some authors 
that accuse the media of “narcotizing” the citizens, who are 
increasingly less participative and less trusting political ins-
titutions and are, in the terms of Robert Putnam, disaffected 
democrats (Robinson, 1976; Patterson, 1993; Fallows, 1996; 
Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Putnam & Pharr, 2000; Putnam, 
2000). As well as some recent analyses state that the empirical 
evidence points out in an opposite direction (Holtz-Bacha, 
1990; Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000).
II. LITERATURE REVIEW2
Theories of Media Malaise
The process by which the theories of media malaise were ge-
nerated is somewhat imprecise. Without a doubt, we find the 
origins of these interpretations in the considerations of Kurt 
Lang and Gladys Lang (1966). They were the first to suggest 
that a connection existed between the proliferation of network 
news and the extension of these feelings of disconnection with 
the political process. From their point of view, the way the 
television covered the news of a political nature could affect 
the fundamental orientations of the electorate towards public 
institutions, including the government. Television broadcasts, 
they argued, accentuate the conflicting elements of the poli-
tical process, which feeds the public cynicism. Nevertheless, 
“the Langs proved an isolated voice at the time, in large part 
because the consensus in political communication was that 
the mass media had only minimal effects on public opinion” 
(Norris, 2000: 5). As a result, a new set of reflections began 
gradually to question the dominant paradigm during the six-
ties. The idea that the mass media had more weight than it had 
been previously thought began to be voiced by several pu-
blications; Paul Weaver (1972), for example, assured that the 
television news formats fomented “detachment (at best)  one 
of the cases or cynical rejection (at worse) toward the political 
institution of the nation” (74).
Nevertheless, 1976 was a crucial year in the development 
and later consolidation of the theory of media malaise. During 
this year, Michael Robinson popularised the term videomalaise 
arguing that preferring television in contrast to newspapers as 
source of political information causes political disaffection. In 
order to explain the growth of videomalaise the author poin-
ted out six interrelated factors: 1) the anomalous magnitude 
and shape of the television news audiences, 2) the public per-
ceptions of the credibility of the networks, 3) the interpretative 
character of television news coverage, 4) the stress on nega-
tive elements of the television news reports, 5) the emphasis 
on the conflict and the violence in network reporting, and 6) 
the anti-institutional theme of news programs on television 
(Robinson, 1976: 426). All these elements came together to 
foment political disaffection, frustration, cynicism and malaise 
of the public.
This perspective, which became consolidated at the end 
of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties, makes spe-
cial sense in the North American political context. Television 
news in the United States. do, indeed, present political life in a 
more negative way than newspapers do (Robinson & Sheehan, 
1983). Political disaffection in the U.S. increases parallel to an 
increase in negative news stories about politicians and poli-
tical institutions in American television (Lichter & Amundson, 
1994) but also newspapers (Patterson, 1993). Thus, the main 
studies that provided theoretical strength to the positions of 
media malaise in the North American context focused rather 
2 For a more exhaustive literature review:  Luengo, 2005 y 2009.
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on the negative media content, in general, than on differences 
between television and newspapers (Patterson, 1993; Schud-
son, 1995; Fallows, 1996; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997).  In 
summary, the theories of media malaise maintain two central 
assumptions: 1) the processes of political communication via 
mass media have a significant impact on the civic engagement 
of the citizens; 2) this impact takes shape in a negative direc-
tion or, in other words, the lack of social commitment towards 
the political process is determined by the process of political 
communication. 
Theories of Political Mobilization
The position presented before is modified by a set of scien-
tific works whose results have been grouped under the label 
of theories of political mobilisation. Even though these new 
interpretations do not eliminate all the previous contributions, 
they propose substantial nuances that question the central ar-
gumentation of the videomalaise. In other words, they suggest 
that contemporary mass media have a significant impact on the 
public —this point is shared with the media malaise position— 
but this influence is produced in a positive direction, that is to 
say, maintaining and promoting democratic participation.
The theories of political mobilization appear on the acade-
mic scene with a great influence in the nineties (Holtz-Bacha, 
1990; Norris, 1996; Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000), right after 
the publication of some research conclusions. We could say 
that the first works in this line arise as a result of the con-
trast of the media malaise hypotheses. To some extent, this 
interpretation considers that, by simply differentiating some 
analytical categories, we can conclude that the media malaise 
theories are not strictly applicable as they were formulated. 
Fundamentally, mobilisation theories underline that “we need 
carefully to disentangle the positive and negative effects of 
different media, messages, audiences and effects” (Norris et 
al., 1999: 99). In this sense, for example, the group of regular 
consumers of television news and habitual readers of political 
press are —regardless of tone of media coverage— more incli-
ned to be informed, interested and committed to political life. 
On the contrary, citizens exposed to sensationalist contents 
usually present significant levels of political disaffection, cyni-
cism and alienation.  
Finally, it is vital to mention the importance of a theory 
that, although framed within the theories of the mobilization, 
acquires a special status, since its considerations entail signi-
ficant advances with respect to the general assumptions; the 
theory of the Virtuous Circle (Norris, 2000). In spite of pro-
posing a similar perspective to the contributions of the theory 
of political mobilization and objecting to the conclusions of 
the media malaise, the theory of the virtuous circle, stated by 
Pippa Norris, goes one step further and provides a more com-
plete theoretical elaboration. As a result of the examination of 
empirical evidence, derived from data analysis of the US and 
Western Europe, one of the main assumptions of this theory 
resides in the following statement: the attention to the news 
in general is not configured as a factor that contributes to the 
erosion of the support for the political system. On the contrary, 
those consistently exposed to news and electoral campaigns 
are revealed as most knowledgeable in political terms, as most 
trusting of the government and the political system, and as the 
most participative in electoral terms. 
In conclusion, Pippa Norris assures that the process of po-
litical communication could be understood as a virtuous circle 
since, in the long term, it reinforces the activism of the activists. 
Indeed, given that this mechanism works in a circle, like a spi-
ral, we can observe a double directionality; the most politically 
informed, those who trust more and are more participative, are 
those who are more exposed to the media coverage of public 
issues. Those that are more exposed to the media coverage of 
public issues are more committed to the political system. This 
assumption implicates that we cannot prove causation or, in 
other words, the direction of causality remains unresolved. It 
is supported by empirical data which shows that especially re-
gular readers of political newspapers are less disaffected than 
people not reading the political press. In contrast, watching 
television news does not seem to have the same positive effect 
(Holtz-Bacha, 1990; Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000).
III. STUDY FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
While the media malaise hypothesis states that the negative 
tone of media coverage —and especially the negative tone of 
television coverage— causes political disaffection, the mobi-
lization hypothesis states that political information from the 
news media —regardless of the tone of coverage— leads to a 
mobilized and trusting public. Both contradicting hypotheses 
have mainly been examined in the U.S. context and seem to be 
supported by empirical studies to the same extent. This may 
be a question of used methods. Studies on the media malaise 
hypothesis usually work with time series analyses comparing 
media content and survey data on the aggregate level (e.g., 
Patterson, 1993) or experiments measuring the influence of 
single media stimuli on the individual level of disaffection 
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(e.g., Capella & Jamieson, 1997). Studies on the mobilization 
hypothesis usually work with survey data on the individual level 
without including media content data at all (e.g., Holtz-Bacha, 
1990). 
To combine those two different points of view, there are two 
possibilities to include media content in surveys on the indivi-
dual level. The first one is to connect individually used media 
content to individual levels of disaffection and to compare the 
different influences of exposure to different media content in 
one country (Miller et al., 1979). This requires content analysis 
of several media and survey data of recipients which includes 
detailed media exposure and measures of political disaffection. 
Data of this kind is, of course, hardly available. The second 
one is to compare the influence of media exposure on politi-
cal disaffection between several countries. Different countries 
have different media systems (e.g., Norris, 2004), and different 
journalistic cultures (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Donsbach & 
Patterson, 2004). Additionally, in different countries there are 
different states of political affairs —political decisions, legis-
lative bills, economic growth etc. Taken together, this should 
lead to different kinds of media content— different topics and 
different tones of coverage (e.g., Rössler, 2004). If media con-
tent is of no importance for the relationship between media 
use and political disaffection, the same pattern should occur 
in every country: citizens heavily exposed to political media 
content should be less disaffected. If media content matters, 
there should be differences between the countries: in some 
countries, there should be a positive relationship, in others, 
there should be a negative relationship or no relationship at all.
Therefore, in our study we are examining the relationship 
between media exposure and political disaffection in 21 Euro-
pean countries taking part in the European Social Survey (ESS). 
Those countries can be grouped with respect to their area of 
location which also means to group them with respect to their 
democratic history. Studies comparing different political cultu-
res state that the level of political disaffection is connected to 
the democratic tradition (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1965). For that 
reason, we distinguished three groups of countries: 1) the well 
established democracies of Western/Northern Europe (Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
and Sweden), 2) the countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Gree-
ce, Italy, and Portugal) with the exception of Italy, a relatively 
young democracy, and 3) the extremely young democracies in 
Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia). 
Compared to media systems in the whole world, the me-
dia systems of the 21 countries included in this study can be 
characterized as free and preventing wide access to political 
information. This holds especially true for the media systems 
of the countries in Western/Northern Europe. Press freedom is 
ranked somewhat lower in the Eastern European countries and 
Italy (Norris, 2004). Studies on journalistic cultures including at 
least some countries included in our study show that journa-
lists in some European countries (Germany, Italy) are more par-
tisan than their colleagues in other countries (Sweden, UK) are 
(e.g., Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). But comparable data for 
all 21 countries is not available. The same holds true for data 
on media content. There are some studies showing that there 
are differences in media content in several European countries 
when it comes to political issues (Peter, 2003; Rössler, 2004). 
But there are no studies systematically comparing the pre-
sentations of politicians and political institutions in different 
countries’ media. In contrast, there are studies on Europeans 
political attitudes. As we have already shown, the three groups 
of European countries traditionally show different levels of po-
litical disaffection. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: The groups of countries differ in their citizens’ levels of 
political disaffection. Citizens living in the Eastern European 
countries will be most disaffected. Citizens in the Western/
Northern European countries will be less disaffected.  
Thus far, there is no comparable data of exposure to poli-
tical media content in those 21 countries. If the assumptions of 
the mobilization hypothesis are correct, citizens living in areas 
with high levels of political disaffection should show the lowest 
levels of exposure to political media content. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis is:
H2: The groups of countries differ in their citizens’ level of ex-
posure to political media content. Citizens living in the Eastern 
European countries will show the lowest levels of exposure. Ci-
tizens in the Western/Northern European countries will show 
the highest levels of exposure.
As we already pointed out, when taking a look at the 
empirical data that has been published, we cannot be sure 
which one of the hypothesis, media malaise or mobilization, 
is correct. We cannot be sure whether the relationship between 
exposure to political media content and political disaffection is 
positive or negative, and —because there is not much compa-
rable research— whether the relationship direction is the same 
in all 21 countries. Therefore, we pose the following research 
questions:
RQ1: Is the relationship between exposure to political media 
content and political disaffection positive or negative?
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RQ2: Is there any difference between the 21 countries when the 
relationship between exposure to political media content and 
political disaffection is concerned?  
Finally, if there are differences between the 21 countries, 
and categorizing them in the three groups mentioned makes 
sense, the following pattern should occur:
H3: If there are differences between the 21 countries when the 
relationship between exposure to political media content and 
political disaffection is concerned, the differences should be 
larger between groups than within groups.
IV. METHOD
Our data comes from the European Social Survey (ESS), mainly 
Round 3. Starting in 2006 and ending in 2007, about 43.000 
Europeans aged 15 years and older had been interviewed face 
to face. The project was jointly founded by the European Com-
mission, the European Science Foundation, and academic fun-
ding bodies in each participating country. Addresses were ran-
domly selected in all 21 countries participating in the study3. 
The exact procedure differed slightly from country to country. 
Table 1 shows the number of respondents and response rates 
in the 21 countries. The differences between non-response 
rates from previous versions of the ESS have been reduced. The 
problems introduced by the “non-response” were reduced by 
weighting the data4. 
Independent variables
The questionnaire included questions on respondents’ ex-
posure to political media content. They were: “On an average 
weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent 
watching news or programmes about political and current 
affairs?” and “On an average weekday, how much of your time 
reading the newspapers is spent reading about politics and cu-
rrent affairs?”. In both cases, the possible answers, presented 
on cards, ranged from 0 (“no time at all”) in grades of half an 
hour to 7 (“more than 3 hours”). Additionally, the questionnaire 
included socio-demographic characteristic of respondents like 
gender, age (year of birth) and education (years of education 
completed) and political interest which will be controlled in 
multivariate analyses presented later.
Dependent variable
As already pointed out, political disaffection can be measu-
red in several ways. One of the alternatives, as Pippa Norris 
(1999) argues, is connected to the concept of political support, 
which could understood on a continuum ranging from general 
support for democracy (diffuse) to support for individual politi-
cians (specific). Rather in the middle of the continuum, we find 
support for political institutions. For that reason, we decided 
to choose trust in the national parliaments as our measure 
of political disaffection. The question was: “Using this card, 
please tell me on a score 0-10 how much you personally trust 
each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust 
an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. 
[country]’s parliament.”
Table 1
 The European Social Survey 2006-2007





 Austria    2 278 94.7
 Belgium 1 770 98.4
Switzerland 1 711 94.8
Germany 2 829 97.0
Denmark 1 484 98.6
Finland 1 883 99.3
France    1 940 97.7
United Kingdom 2 346 98.0
Ireland 1 720 95.6
Luxembourg 1 458 89.2
Netherlands 1 866 98.8
Norway 1 743 99.6
Sweden 1 879 97.5
Southern Europe
Spain 1 779 94.9
Greece 2 406 98.4
Italy 1 515 98.0
Portugal 2 079 93.6
Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 3 026 96.0
Hungary 1 456 95.9
Poland 1 673 97.2
Slovenia 1 404 95.1
 Source: European Social Survey (Round 2, Round 3).
3 We are using 21 countries out of the 30 that compose the sample.
4 For more detailed information see: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
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V. FINDINGS
Trust in national parliaments
H1 states that political disaffection will be lowest in the well 
established democracies of Western/Northern Europe and 
highest in the young democracies in Eastern Europe. Table 
2 shows that this proves almost completely to be right. The 
seven countries with highest levels of trust in national parlia-
ments are located in Western and especially Northern Europe. 
Trust is highest in Denmark (M = 6.4, SD = 2.1) and Finland (M 
= 6.0, SD = 2.1). With slight exception of Slovenia, the citizens 
of Eastern European countries are most disaffected. Trust is 
lowest in Poland (M = 2.7, SD = 2.2) and the Czech Republic 
(M = 3.2, SD = 3.2). Comparing the three groups of countries, 
we find an average mean of 4.75 in Western/Northern Europe 
of 4.47 in Southern Europe and of 3.35 in Eastern Europe. In-
terestingly, standard deviations do not differ that much. This 
means that the differences between respondents within the 
three groups are about the same.
Exposure to political media content
H2 states that citizens of Eastern European countries will be 
less exposed to political media content while citizens of Wes-
tern/Northern European countries will show the highest expo-
sure levels. This hypothesis proves right to some extent but 
not completely. Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents 
showing high levels of exposure to political media content. In 
our definition, these are respondents watching political infor-
mation in television more than one hour per day and reading 
political newspaper content more than half an hour per day. 
The percentage of heavy users of political information in te-
levision ranges from 33.5 percent in Norway to 12.6 percent 
in Czech Republic. The percentage of heavy users of political 
information in newspapers ranges from 32.9 percent in Norway 
to 12.7 percent in Hungary. Looking at the three groups of 
countries, we, indeed, see that in average exposure to political 
media content is lowest in Eastern Europe. This holds true for 
television (16 percent) as well as for newspapers (15 percent). 
On the other hand, there is hardly any difference between the 
countries in the South and in the West/North. In both regions, 
we find somewhat more  heavy users of political newspaper 
content (27/25 vs. 26/22, respectively). But the differen-
ces are only marginal. To sum it up, on the aggregate level 
the relatively low exposure to political media content seems 
to be a cause of the relatively low levels of political trust in 
Eastern Europe. Additionally, media exposure does not explain 
the difference between trust levels in Western/Northern and 
Southern Europe. Going a bit more in the details and having a 
look to single countries, we even find some contradictions. For 
example, in Ireland exposure to political media content is rela-
tively high but trust is low. The opposite holds true for Sweden. 
Despite low levels of exposure to political media, content trust 
is relatively high. 
Table 2 
Trust in national parliaments 
in 21 European countries
Mean SD



























 Note: Scale ranging from 0 (no trust) to 10 (complete trust)
 Source: European Social Survey (Round 2, Round 3).
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education and political interest. Table 4 shows the results. With 
respect to our control variables, we see in all of the 21 countries 
a strong and significant influence of political interest on trust 
in national parliaments. In most countries, we find that higher 
educated citizens are more trustful. In some countries, younger 
people and male respondents show higher levels of trust. More 
important, the influence of exposure to political media content 
is quite mixed. In two Western democracies (Norway, Austria), 
we find a negative influence of watching political information 
in television on trust: the higher respondents’ exposure to 
television news, the less they are trusting. On the other hand, 
in none of the 21 countries there is a positive influence of 
watching television news on trust. In contrast, in four Western 
democracies (Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway), 
we find a positive influence of reading political information in 
the newspaper on trust: the higher respondents’ exposure to 
political content in newspapers, the more they are trusting. The 
same holds true in one Eastern European country (Czech Re-
public). Finally,  in any of the Southern European countries we 
can find a significant connection between exposure and trust, 
neither negative nor positive. Taken together, H3 —stating that 
differences between the three groups of countries are larger 
than differences within the groups when the influence of media 
exposure on political disaffection is concerned— proves almost 
to be wrong. If there is a significant influence of exposure to 
political media content on trust in national parliaments, it is in 
the same direction (negative for TV, positive for newspapers), 
not only within the groups but also between the groups. In 
Southern Europe, negative β coefficients, quite close significant 
in the case of Portugal, show to be almost an exception in the 
case of newspapers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study examines the influence of exposure to political 
media content on political disaffection. In former studies, di-
fferent results have been obtained. Some studies have shown 
that negative media content leads to political disaffection. This 
has been called the media malaise hypothesis. Other studies 
have shown that exposure to political media content —regar-
dless of its tone— leads to informed and mobilized citizens. 
This has been called the mobilization hypothesis. To examine, 
which of them holds true, we analyzed the relationship bet-
ween exposure to political media content and trust in national 
parliaments in 21 European countries taking part in the last 
European Social Survey. The countries differ in their political 
systems and in their democratic tradition, as well as in their 
journalistic cultures. Our results show clear difference in the 
levels of trust between the countries. Respondents from the 
Table 3 
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 Source: European Social Survey (Round 2, Round 3).
The influence of exposure to political media content on 
trust in national parliaments
RQ1 asks whether the relationship between exposure to politi-
cal media content and political disaffection is positive or nega-
tive. RQ2 asks whether this holds true to the same extent in all 
of the countries. To examine this, we run OLS-Regressions for 
every single country. In the analyses, we control gender, age, 
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well established Western/Northern democracies show high 
levels of trust in their parliaments. Respondents from the 
younger democracies in the South show lower levels of trust 
while respondents from the extremely young democracies in 
the East show the lowest levels of trust. When it comes to the 
influence of media exposure on trust, we find strong patterns. 
Firstly, watching television news has not a positive influence on 
trust at all. In contrast, in at least two countries, it has a nega-
tive influence. This clearly contradicts mobilization hypothesis. 
Secondly, exposure to political content in newspapers has a 
positive influence on trust in parliament in 4 out of 13 Wes-
tern/Northern democracies. Interestingly, all of them belong to 
the countries showing the highest levels of trust. It also has 
a positive influence in one out of four Eastern democracies. 
Both results seem to support mobilization hypothesis, since 
in Southern countries, we find a negative influence of expo-
sure to political content in newspapers on trust, but never 
with enough statistical signification. 
Taken together, mobilization hypothesis cannot be 
supported totally. It states that exposure to political media 
content —regardless of its tone— mobilizes the recipients. 
In this case, we should have found about the same results in 
all 21 countries, and for every media outlet controlled. Why 
Table 4
 Causes of trust in national parliaments in 21 European countries
Gender










Western/Northern Europe     
Austria .006 .005 .109*** -.168*** -.066** -.020 .045
Belgium -.038 .115*** .089** -.255*** -.043 .022 .104
Switzerland .005 .095** .082** -.083** .018 .029 .024
Germany .030 -.009 .065** -.077** .025 .084*** .029
Denmark .086** .032 .193*** -.176*** .047 .002 .097
Finland .014 .141*** .091*** -.163*** .006 .040 .063
France .047 -.043 .210*** -.129*** .013 -.015 .077
United Kingdom .031 -.021 .113 -.116*** -.042 -.036 .028
Ireland .106*** -.025 .009 -.210*** -.054 .020 .058
Luxembourg .053 .005 -.014 -.116** . 001 .113** .035
Netherlands .044 .078** .117*** -.182*** -.044 .056* .076
Norway .009 .012 .207*** -.151*** -.053* .079** .100
Sweden .103*** .049 .171*** -.209*** -.020 .039 .113
Southern Europe
Spain -.010 -.052 .012 -.243*** .041 -.030 .059
Greece -.041 -.015 .010 -.241*** -.014 -.010 .050
Italy ----- -.036 .064* -.258*** -.024 -.014 .068
Portugal .008 -.024 .039 -.239*** -.027 -.041 .064
Eastern Europe
Czech Republic -.017 .078** .046* -.066** -.007 .078** .016
Hungary -.008 -.051 .117*** -.100** .049 -.021 .031
Poland -.010 -.010 .021 -.115** -.028 -.011 .007
Slovenia .098** .011 .043 -.123** -.019 -.029 .023
 * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
 Source: European Social Survey (Round 2, Round 3).
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was this not the case? We do not believe that this is a question 
of different recipient characteristics in different countries. In 
our opinion, this is a question of media content. Following 
the media malaise hypothesis, we assume that a longstanding 
negative presentation of political affairs leads to political di-
saffection. Of course, the same holds true for the opposite: a 
longstanding positive presentation of political affairs leads to 
political trust. Especially, in the Northern European countries 
the level of trust in parliament is extremely high. In the same 
countries, there is a strong influence of newspaper exposure 
on trust in parliament.       
       
 We assume that the level of trust is high because of a 
longstanding relatively positive presentation of political affairs 
in those countries’ newspapers. Given the positive influence of 
newspaper exposure on trust in at least one young Eastern de-
mocracies, we can assume that those citizens —when political 
media content is relatively positive for a longer period— make 
up their deficits in trust. In the long run, they may overtake the 
countries in the South where there is no influence of exposure 
to political content in newspapers on trust. 
Of course, this analysis is only a first step. We cannot 
prove our assumptions to be right without having comparable 
content analysis data for all of the 21 countries. Only when 
this is the case, we can definitely say that the different results 
in different countries are really caused by different kinds of 
media content. Nevertheless, comparing the relationship bet-
ween media exposure and political trust in different countries 
leads to valuable results. Exposure to political media content is 
not necessarily mobilizing the public. This holds true in some 
countries. Future studies should further examine the causes of 
those differences.     










A Virtuous Circle for All?
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